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The Wilsonian Challenge to International Law

Leonard V. Smith
Frederick B. Artz Professor of History, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH, U.S.A.

After the Great War, Woodrow Wilson challenged the foundations of international law based on fully sovereign states. “Wilsonianism” as elaborated
in the Fourteen Points, and in other speeches, rested on a logic that made
a universalized liberal individual the locus of sovereignty in the new world
order. The truly radical implications of Wilsonianism had no sterner critic
than Robert Lansing, Wilson’s secretary of state and one of the founders
of the American Journal of International Law. Lansing held tenaciously to
a positivist paradigm of international law as it had evolved by the early
twentieth century. This article reconsiders the conflict between Wilson
and Lansing not so much as a duel between individuals as a duel between
conflicting conceptions of sovereignty and the purpose of international law
in the new world order.
Introduction
As Secretary of State Robert Lansing told the story, President Woodrow
Wilson informed him at a particularly tense meeting on 10 January 1919
“with great candor and emphasis that he did not intend to have lawyers
drafting the treaty of peace.”1 Only a former member of the legal profession

1)

Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1921), 107. This version appears to come from “The President’s Draft of a Covenant
for a League of Nations,” a memo he apparently wrote to himself and found in the Lansing
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011
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could speak of it with such contempt.2 Lansing, having made his career as
an international lawyer, took the remark personally – the way he believed
Wilson intended it.3 A fixation on the personal has inflected much historical
writing on Wilson, painting him as either a fool, or prophet, or martyr to
idealism.4 Lansing, while a decidedly more obscure figure today, had made a
distinguished career as an international lawyer before he entered the Wilson
administration. At the very least Lansing showed an ability to get under
Wilson’s skin intellectually and, in the end, politically. Peacemaking after
the Great War was filled with larger-than-life personalities, and historians
have long found it tempting to get caught up in their personal melodramas.
I would argue, however, that fixating on personalities can obscure far
more important issues in the rebuilding of international law and world order
after the Great War. The personal nature of what became a dysfunctional
relationship between Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing is far from its
most interesting feature. Of much greater significance are their two very
different articulations of the relationship between law and sovereignty. Both
believed that law followed from sovereignty, and not the reverse. The differences between them on the issue revolved around the locus of sovereignty,

Papers at the Library of Congress, reprinted in Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, 69 vols., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966–94), vol. 54: 3–4. Hereafter
referred to as PWW. Tasker Howard Bliss, another member of the American delegation,
also described the meeting in a letter to Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker, 11 January
1919, vol. 53: 719–21.
2) Wilson had practiced law briefly and unhappily in Atlanta in 1882–83. Though admitted
to the Georgia bar, he soon fled the legal profession for doctoral study in political science
and history at the Johns Hopkins University. See John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A
Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009).
3)

Lansing had joined the Wilson administration as counselor to the State Department in
March 1914, and succeeded William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state in June 1915. Relations between Lansing and Wilson, never warm, steadily worsened over the course of the
Paris Peace Conference. An infirm Wilson finally aksed for Lansing’s resignation in February
1920. On Lansing’s career, see Thomas H. Hartig, Robert Lansing: An Interpretive Biography
(New York: Arno Press, Dissertations in American Biography Series, 1982).
4)

For the former point of view, see the rather marginal book by Jim Powell, Wilson’s War:
How Woodrow Wilson’s Great Blunder Led to Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, and World War II (New
York: Crown Forum, 2005). Wilsonians have produced a more helpful historiography, such
as John Milton Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for
the League of Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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and just how sovereignty produced law. Profoundly different imagined
world orders resulted.
Why use Lansing as a counterpoint to Wilson on international law in the
new world order? At the Paris Peace Conference, Lansing and Wilson were
both political figures intensely interested in the theory as well as the practice
of international law. Looking at them together makes it possible to view
conflicting paradigms of the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries in a single
administration. This being said, Lansing likely would not even have claimed
to be the most brilliant legal mind in the American delegation to Paris, a
distinction that might have gone to James Brown Scott.5 Indeed, Lansing
merits at most passing mention in histories of international law covering this
period.6 Yet the conflicting views of Lansing and Wilson provide a unique
way to study the interaction between politics and international law at a
pivotal juncture, if we view each as to some extent embodying conflicting
categories and objectives of the pre- and post-war eras.
Lansing was a figure closely identified with prewar international law, in
which, in David Kennedy’s words, “sovereignty became the central reference point for the field and came to have a uniform doctrinal meaning.”7
He thus fits well into Kennedy’s call to re-examine nineteenth century legal
theorists as they faced the challenges of reconstructing the international
system after the Great War.8 Wilson, for his part, was the self-conscious
prophet of a paradigm shift in international law that in time would bring
about, in Kennedy’s words “the transformation of international lawyers into

5)

See John Hepp, “James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law,” Journal
of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 7 (2008): 151–79.
6) One mention in Francis Anthony Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898–1922 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 126;
four in Mark Weston Janis, America and the Law of Nations, 1776–1939 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), all of them a chapter entirely about Wilsonianism, 159–75.
7)

David Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion,”
Nordic Journal of International Law 65 (1996): 403. He cites Lansing as an example of this
uniformity of meaning on page 307. Kennedy’s interpretation relies on the convention of a
“long” nineteenth century, extending to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

8) The “illusion” in Kennedy’s subtitle “History of an Illusion” refers to a need of twentiethcentury pragmatists to construct an illusory image of their forebears of the preceding century
in order to distance themselves from them. See pp. 389–90.
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polemicists for internationalism …”9 But as Kennedy suggested, the two
eras could not be so easily disentangled as either Lansing or Wilson believed.
Before 1914, Lansing had published extensively on sovereignty and the
origin of law. He operated within a positivist paradigm closely associated
with the American Journal of International Law since its early days.10 Law
among nations proceeded not through the application of an abstract philosophical system, but experientially and gradually.11 International law was
thus the result of acts of consent among sovereign actors, nation-states that
make treaties and create international legal institutions. Legal institutions
operated primarily as instruments of arbitration, in accordance with precedents within the terms of the specific agreements among states through
which these institutions were established. Thus, they did not “create” law
except in the most incremental manner, through the interpretation of law
as the expressed will of the states that had joined together for that purpose.
From this state-centered view of international law, Lansing later provided
a strident critique of Wilsonianism, the Paris Peace Conference, and the
world order that both sought to create.
I take “Wilsonianism” here as the ideological sum total of the speeches
of Woodrow Wilson. These speeches, and their author, have often been
criticized as long on soaring rhetoric and short on specifics. At its worst,
“Wilsonianism” in the eyes of its critics constituted little more than an
incoherent amalgam of vague principles. I claim, however, that the problem with Wilsonianism was not its incoherence, but its radicalism. Wilson
pushed nineteenth-century liberalism to its logical conclusion, and made
the rational, ethically responsible individual the locus of sovereignty, and
thus the giver of law. This self-sovereign individual constituted the building block of all larger political configurations, from the locality, to the
nation, to the international system. This individual was the proper “self ”
of “self-determination.”

9)

Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century,” 390.

10)

See Boyle, Foundations of World Order, 10–12; Frederic L. Kirgis, The American Society of
International Law’s First Century: 1906–2006 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006);
and Carl Landauer, “The Ambivalences of Power: Launching the American Journal of International Law in an Era of Empire and Globalization,” Leiden Journal of International Law
20 (2007): 325–58.

11)

On the distinction between positivism and “naturalism” in the nineteenth century, see
Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century,” 397–98.
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Such a conception of sovereignty had revolutionary implications for
international law. Wilson, in a nutshell, sought to take international law
out of the hands of states and give it to the true sovereign. A global community of politically commensurable individuals would become the effective
lawgiver on the most vital issues of international law – war and peace. In
such matters, the sovereign would act according to a single ethical system
applicable the world over. States and Great Powers would still exist, but they
would have no legitimate interests incompatible with that ethical system.
International law would simply reflect individual ethics on a global scale,
and would be given the force of law through the common will of the collective citizenry of the world.
Such a conception of international law would have little patience for
conventions such as arbitration or precedents, just as the person of Woodrow
Wilson would show diminishing patience for the person of Robert Lansing
as the peace conference proceeded. But the particulars of the peace settlement, and Lansing’s critique of them, throw into sharp relief the different
conceptions of the relationship between sovereignty and international law.
Much more was at stake than the egos of two articulate and accomplished
men of their time.
Sovereignty and the Origins of International Law
Both Lansing and Wilson held to the positivist notion that law was an
expression of sovereignty and not the reverse. As Lansing put it in 1907:
“Laws are the expressions of the sovereign will.”12 But if law proceeds from
sovereignty, the attributes and locus of sovereignty are of considerable
significance in determining the source, legitimacy, and function of international law. Consequently, the differences between Lansing and Wilson
over the role of international law in shaping international law in the wake
of the Great War were not so much those of law as such, but of sovereignty.
Lansing wrote four major articles on sovereignty between 1907 and 1913,
which were published together in 1921.13 As a good positivist, he claimed a

12)

Robert Lansing, “Notes on Sovereignty in a State,” American Journal of International
Law 1 (April 1907): 319. Hereafter cited as AJIL.

13)

Robert Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty: From the Standpoint of the State and of the World
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 1921). This work brought
together the following: “Notes on Sovereignty in a State,” (two parts), AJIL 1 (1907): 105–28;
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Burkean suspicion of theory, and an almost unlimited faith in the analytical
possibilities of the “objective” observation of political society. “We live in a
utilitarian age,” he wrote in 1913, “when the actual and practical dominate
human thought.”14 For Lansing, sovereignty reflected power, expressed as
physical force. As such, sovereignty has a primordial character. When and
where humans organize, there is sovereignty. In temporal affairs, “sovereignty
may be defined as the power to the extent of human capacity to do all things
on the earth without accountability.”15 The sovereign is nothing more and
nothing less than the individual or collection of individuals who command
the preponderance of force: “He commands and is obeyed because he can
compel obedience.”16 Sovereignty precedes any form of law. As Lansing
summarized the matter: “The supreme coercive physical power I would
define as sovereignty; the expression of the dominant will or its possessor of
possessors I would define as law.”17
In this sense, law is law, whether it comes from a chief wielding a club, a
king issuing a royal decree, a president signing a bill into a law, or an international court of arbitration giving a ruling. As a function of sovereignty,
law has no moral character ipso facto: “Might may make law, but might
does not make right.”18 Civil liberties could have a certain moral or ethical
standing, but exist as a practical and legal matter only at the discretion of
the sovereign. “Actual civil liberty,” Lansing wrote, “must not be confounded
with the right of civil liberty.”19 Legal institutions do not themselves make
law, but can articulate the expressed sovereign will. Decisions of these institutions are thus accepted as law “by tacit acquiescence of the sovereign.”20
Of course, Lansing was well aware that human society left behind in
prehistory a situation in which matters of superiority and subordination

297–320; “A Definition of Sovereignty,” Proceedings of the American Political Science Association 10 (1913): 61–75; and “Notes on World Sovereignty,” AJIL 15 (1921): 13–27. Subsequent
citations refer to the article versions.
14)

Lansing, “Definition of Sovereignty,” 62.

15)

Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 1, 107. Italics in original.

16)

Lansing, “Definition of Sovereignty,” 64.

17)

Lansing, “Definition of Sovereignty,” 74. Italics in original.

18)

Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 1, 122.

19)

Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 2, 306–307.

20)

See Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 2, 315–17.
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were resolved by physical force alone. Habitual obedience, first to the
hereditary proprietors of sovereignty, then to more popular based political communities, created various manifestations of “artificial” sovereignty.
“Artificial” means simply sovereignty institutionalized through something
other than the direct application of physical force. Theoretically, law can
come from either the “real” or the “artificial” sovereign. Most commonly,
the real sovereign creates the institutions of the artificial sovereign, which
administers the peaceful, day-to-day exercise of power.21 But by definition,
the real sovereign cannot disappear, and retains the ultimate power to decide.
The most important example was the American Civil War, which continued
to haunt American legal thinking at the time Lansing wrote. North and
South never tested secession in the federal courts or in the Congress, rather
on the field of battle in a resort to brute force. The “real” sovereign of the
United States prevailed, and imposed its will over the Confederacy. That
outcome determined the locus of sovereignty over the national territory.22
By the beginning of the twentieth century, sovereignty throughout the
world had expressed itself in the state, in Lansing’s words “the highest form
of a political organism in that it has attained complete development.”23
What he described as a “political state” is simply a community organized
to exercise sovereignty. A “territorial state” constitutes the geographic
region over which the political state rules. Both remain distinct from the
“nation,” most commonly meaning an ethnic or linguistic community.24
Lansing agreed with Henry Wheaton that a state, political or territorial, can
exercise two forms of sovereignty – internal (pertaining to domestic affairs)
and external (pertaining to foreign affairs).25 In a federal union such as the
United States, fully sovereign individual states surrendered their external
sovereignty forever in accepting the 1787 constitution. Those states continued to possess significant internal sovereignty. But the federal government
henceforth became the final and exclusive arbiter in their relations with
each other, and in the external relations of the United States. The outcome

21)

See Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 1, 115–16; 121–22.

22)

See Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 1, 127–28, and Robert Lansing, “Notes on
World Sovereignty,” AJIL 15 (1921): 67–68.
23)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 13.

24)

See Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 1, 109–110.

25)

Lansing, “Sovereignty in a State,” Part 2, 300–302.
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of the Civil War, determined through brute force by the “real” sovereign
of the Union, affirmed the federal government as the sole proprietor of
external sovereignty.
Lansing authored an examination of sovereignty and the origins of law
in the international system in 1906. But because, in his words, the piece
“seemed too speculative and to lack the practical value” of the previous
essays on sovereignty in a state, it was not published until 1921.26 Strictly
speaking, real “world sovereignty” existed in that body of individuals which
could compel obedience on the part of the entire human race.27 For the
present, this sovereignty lacked organization as any form of world state
and resided in the collectivity of individual states. No state could be considered truly independent, in that it could not hope successfully to resist
the combined force of all the others. Consequently, Lansing wrote, “every
state, whether strong or weak, whether great or small, whether rich or poor,
whether civilized or barbarous, is in a sense a protectorate, a ward of the
other states in the world, holding its political powers of them and responsible to them for its international conduct.”28 He posited that an existing
Community of Nations in the world, as it further articulated its rules of
conduct through international law, would in time positively express its
sovereignty in “an organized political union, a Federal World State.”29 Thus,
he did not take state sovereignty as intrinsically eternal in its current form.
Indeed, his speculations on world sovereignty support Kennedy’s contention: “If nineteenth century international lawyers had a blind faith, it was
in law, not sovereignty.”30
In the meantime, the political and territorial state constituted the practical
locus of sovereignty in the present world. Basic principles of international
law, such as the independence of states and the equality of states, evolved
to provide enforceable rules of conduct within the Community of Nations.
The equality of nations, on which Lansing would later base so much of his
critique of Wilsonianism, was a manifestation of artificial world sovereignty.

26)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 13. He claimed that he published the 1906
manuscript without revision.

27)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 14.

28)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 19.

29)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 19. Emphasis in original.

30)

Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century,” 405.

Smith / Journal of the History of International Law 13 (2011) 179–208

187

Just as citizens in a state claim an equal stake in the sovereignty of that state,
each nation claims an equal stake in the sovereignty of the world.31 But the
equality of nations remains artificial rather than real, and by definition can
exist only because it has not been tested by physical force. In other words,
equality serves as a legal fiction that helps nations keep the peace, however
essential its role in doing so.
In the normal workings of international relations, artificial world sovereignty continued to be articulated through “the great states of the civilized
world [which] have recognized, perhaps unconsciously, its existence in the
applied law of nations …” 32 The rules of international law have accreted
gradually, and “find expression in the practices and utterances of governments, and coincident interpretations are frequently set forth in treaties.”33
Somewhat in contrast to his explanation of law as a function of sovereignty
independent of morality, Lansing argued that “natural justice” has exerted a
moral influence over international law over time as nations progress internally, and in their relations with each other. On certain broad issues such
as piracy (a “crime against the world”) or the slave trade (a “crime against
humanity”),34 international repugnance has been such that efforts through
international law to suppress them have attained the character of an explicit
expression of world sovereignty.
Writing eight years before the outbreak of the Great War, Lansing foresaw
a bright future for an international law, to apply Kennedy’s words, “flexible
and innovative in its reasoning, deferential to state power, but cosmopolitan
in its ambition”.35 States would find it ever more convenient and fair to settle their differences through the law than by the sword. As states progress
internally, international law would grow in authority as well as in virtue. As
this happened, international relations and international law would increasingly reflect the will of the combined peoples of the world:
… the Law of Nations is based immediately upon morality, equity, and reason, those qualities which should be preëminent in the Universal Sovereign

31)

See Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 21.

32)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 14.

33)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 23.

34)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 25.

35)

Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century,” 417.
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of mankind, the perfection whose will should find manifestation in the laws
emanating from the highest political authority in the world, a code perfect
in righteousness.36

In turn, international institutions would follow the progressive teleology of
international law, notably through international courts. Eventually, world
sovereignty would find expression in a world state. Just as the Thirteen
Colonies combined to form a federal union in the Constitution of 1787,
the states of the world would likely combine one day to form a world state.
This state “presumably will be of a federal character for two reasons, first,
because the world is already divided into organized groups of individuals
forming political states, and, second, because the federal state is the most
highly developed political organism of modern civilization.”37 History would
not create a United States of the World in precisely the same way it created
the United States of America. But no one should be mistaken about the
universal character of American federal institutions.
Lansing’s prewar writings on sovereignty and international law remained
reticent on two issues central to his later critique of Wilsonianism--the
centrality of arbitration and the role of the Great Powers. His occasional
and oblique references to arbitration are perhaps the more surprising, given
how prominently his work with arbitration tribunals figured in his career
before he joined the State Department.38 Perhaps he simply took arbitration
for granted as the obvious means through which to adjudicate international
disputes, and thus not in need of extensive explanation. After the Great War,
he clearly became more suspicious of the role of the Great Powers than he
had been before it. In 1906, he praised the role of the “great states of the
civilized world” in creating the Law of Nations. In a 1911 book review, he
noted: “How far a concert of the Powers can go in controlling the affairs
of the world is a subject of uncertainty, but it at least offers a means for the
accomplishment of certain things which seem otherwise unattainable.”39

36)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 27.

37)

Lansing, “Notes on World Sovereignty,” 15.

38)

See Ephraim Smith, “Robert Lansing and the Paris Peace Conference,” (Ph.D. Diss.,
Johns Hopkins University, 1972), 2–42.
39)

Robert Lansing, Review of T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, AJIL 5
(1911): 1116–7.
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During and after the Paris Peace Conference, he would bitterly criticize
Wilson for doing just this.
Wilson had encountered contemporary thinking on international law
long before he became president. Indeed, he taught a course entitled “International Law” at Princeton as early as 1892, though he admitted to his wife
the common pedagogical challenge of staying ahead of his students.40 In his
1889 college textbook, The State, Woodrow Wilson wrote: “Law is the will
of the State concerning the civic conduct of those under its authority.”41 He
stated matters this way because, simply put, he could not imagine sovereignty
residing anywhere else. International law, he wrote, is “not law at all in the
strict sense of the term,” because “there is no authority set above the nations
whose command it is.”42 What Mark Weston Janis has described as Wilson’s
“very limited, rather Austinian description of the role of international law
in international relations”43 would change profoundly – not because of he
came to hold different views on the relationship between sovereignty and law,
but rather on the locus of sovereignty. By 1918, Wilson had come to believe
that the American experience had bred a political community that made
the individual rather than the state the locus of sovereignty. “Wilsonianism”
involved extending this community across the globe.
Historians well understand the profound and complex debt of Wilsonianism to the nineteenth-century liberal tradition.44 Less well understood,
perhaps, is just how radical a challenge Wilsonianism posed to an international order based on states, and consequently to a state-based paradigm of
international law. The apparently unstable amalgam called “Wilsonianism”
has a certain internal consistency if we consider the individual the building
block of all political configurations. This individual is the proper “self ” of

40)

Janis, America and the Law of Nations, 159.

41)

Woodrow Wilson, The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics (Boston: D.C.
Heath & Co., 1889), 610.
42)

Wilson, The State, 629.

43)

Janis, America and the Law of Nations, 162.

44)

See the enduringly perceptive essay by Richard Hofstadter, “Woodrow Wilson: The
Conservative as Liberal,” The Amerian Political Tradition and the Men who Made It (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 230–78. See also Niels Aage Thorsen, The Political Thought of
Woodrow Wilson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Thomas J. Knock, To
End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992).
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“self-determination.” All other configurations are simply this individual
writ large.
To Wilson, the political individual was rational, autonomous, and morally accountable – thus in some sense “self-sovereign.” He45 was guided by
a system of universal ethics that were arguably Kantian, but probably more
directly descended from Calvinist theology and its secularized reformulation in the Scottish Enlightenment.46 Simply put, political individuals were
people who could make covenants. “Covenant” was not a term commonly
used in American diplomacy either before or after Wilson. Individuals make
covenants, as a sacred and irrevocable vow committing them totally and
individually to each other. In so doing, they become a kind of sacrilized
community. The Biblical Hebrews became a people through a covenant,
as did the Pilgrims in colonial Massachusetts. Americans became a people
through the de facto covenants of the Declaration of Independence and
the United States Constitution. Religious or civil, a covenant for Wilson
had a quasi-religious quality, and constituted an individualized and totalized commitment to the collectivity. The covenant made the individual
both the author and the object of law, whatever the national community
to which he belonged.
Wilson’s individual who freely bound himself by covenant constituted the
building block of political society, from the smallest locality to the global
community. It was not by chance that Point I of the Fourteen Points referred
to “open covenants, openly arrived at,” and that the Treaty of Versailles
began with “The Covenant of the League of Nations.”47 To Wilson, victory
in the Great War could become complete only by placing covenants and
the universalized political individual capable of making them at the center
of a new international order.
Locating sovereignty at the level of individual had truly radical implications. In a fully Wilsonian world, all political collectivities would comprise
like individuals who wanted the same sorts of things from the collectivity.

45) Like many liberals of his day, and notwithstanding his debt in the close presidential
election of 1916 to votes from women in states in which they had the suffrage (see Knock,
To End All Wars, 101), Wilson tended to construe the political individual as male and white.
46)

On the influence of Wilson’s Calvinist religious beliefs, see Hofstadter, “Conservative
as Liberal,” 234–35; and Thorsen, Political Thought, 4–11.

47)

This widely available text will be cited only by internal references.
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This made possible the subtle but critical shift in Wilson’s language from 1915
on, from references to “consent of the governed” to “self-determination.”48
The liberal individual made both terms expressions of the same thing.
Commensurable individuals would make commensurable covenants, in
communities ranging from regional religious communities to the community of nations itself.
Difference did not disappear within the Wilsonian community. Some
forms of difference, such as religion and ethnicity, could be recognized and
legitimized, but would remain bounded by the values of the covenanted
community. Some forms of difference, notably race, could determine
whether individuals or categories of individuals were eligible to make a
covenant at all. Likewise, racial difference could determine whether a given
community merited “self-determination.” The successful management of
difference, Wilson believed, had made the United States a universal example
to inspire the world. It was utterly without irony or fear of self-contradiction
that Wilson and Wilsonians could speak of a disinterested and unselfish
American approach to peacemaking, and of remaking the world in the image of the United States.49
“World government” would thus exist at the level of the individual, in
a global community of commensurable, self-sovereign citizens. The task of
peacemaking after the Great War involved nothing less than establishing
institutions that would properly express this sovereignty. The nation-state,
and most particularly the Great Powers, did not need to disappear. Indeed,
the Great Powers as an organized collectivity would play a pivotal role both
in making the peace and in the League of Nations. But in the Wilsonian
Promised Land, states in general and Great Powers in particular would operate in accordance with the will of the liberal individuals they comprised.
These individuals would make up a single global community that would
keep states in check. Collectively, they had a sovereign will beyond that of
the nation-state. First among the wishes of the sovereign people of the world,

48) On this shift, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007),
42–43; and Michla Pomerance, “The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives
on the Wilsonian Conception,” AJIL 70 (1976): 1–27, esp. 1–3.
49)

See also Leonard V. Smith, “Les États-Unis et l’échec d’une seconde mobilisation,” in
Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Christophe Prochasson, eds., Sortir de la Guerre de 14–18
(Paris: Tallandier, 2008), 69–91.
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Wilson held, was the formation of a community of states by covenant, the
League of Nations. Once established, the League would both draw from
and reinforce the inherently liberal character of the peoples of the world.
In his speaking tour of major Allied cities before the opening of the Paris
Peace Conference, Wilson explained that an international covenant formed
by the victorious powers at the time of the Armistice through accepting
Wilsonianism as the ideological basis of the peace had forever changed the
world order. “Men have never before realized,” he said at a state banquet in
Buckingham Palace in London on 27 December 1918, “how little difference
there was between right and justice in one latitude and in another, under
one sovereignty and another.”50 He added the next day at the Guildhall in
London that “the ground is cleared and the foundations laid – for we have
already accepted the same body of principles.”51 No politician and no nation
dared resist the expressed will of the true sovereign, as he told an audience
at the Free Trade Hall in Manchester on 30 December 1918: “We are not
obeying the mandates of parties or of politics. We are obeying the mandate
of humanity.”52 This rephrased the extraordinary statement he had made in
the “Metropolitan Opera” speech before the Armistice, on 27 September:
“The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular
purposes of individual states.”53
Paradoxically, given its reliance on self-sovereign individualism, Wilsonianism carried within itself a theory of power in general, and the Great
Power in particular. Wilson assuredly believed that power existed, and that
it was distributed unevenly among the nations and peoples of the world.
The point was more how those with power used it. He told listeners at the
Guildhall in London on 28 December 1918: “the small and the weak could
never live free in the world unless the strong and the great always put their
power and their strength in the service of right.”54 As a career educator,
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Woodrow Wilson, International Ideals: Speeches and Addresses made during the President’s
European Visit, December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1919),
24.
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Wilson, International Ideals, 30.
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Wilson, International Ideals, 45.

53) Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Albert Bushnell Hart, ed. (New
York: Bone and Liveright, 1918), 276.
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Wilson certainly had no trouble with the notion that some knew better
than others just what “right” constituted. As a Progressive who became a
wartime president, Wilson was likewise comfortable with centralized direction first of the affairs of his own nation, and then those of the world,
provided the directors remained subject in one way or another to a de facto
plebiscite from below.55
The victory of the Allied and Associated Powers, Wilson believed, had
resulted from a historic combination of might and right. At the time of the
Armistice, the Great Powers had had accepted a common set of principles as
the foundation for the new world order. They had thus become “great” in a
moral as well as material sense. Accordingly, they deserved a predominant
voice in determining the peace. To evoke terms coined later by Carl Schmitt,
the Great Powers claimed sovereignty over the world order by claiming the
right to decide upon the exception – what there was to decide as well as how
to decide it.56 As such, they constituted a liberal “vanguard” uncomfortably parallel to the band of Bolsheviks at that very moment endeavoring
simultaneously to maintain control in Moscow and to overthrow the world
order. Much to the consternation of Lansing, Wilson readily accepted an
organization of the Paris Peace Conference that centralized decision-making
not just in the hands of the Great Powers, but ultimately in the hands of
the “Big Four” (himself, French premier Georges Clemenceau, British
Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio
Orlando).57 Wilson saw no inherent problem with concentrating power in
a handful of suitably enlightened individuals, provided they fashioned the
peace in accordance with the presumed will of the global sovereign.
In short, Wilson construed the victory of 1918 as heralding a revolution
in sovereignty across the globe. “Humanity,” in the form of millions of
liberal individuals operating in accordance with common values and ethics,
had become the effective world sovereign. They were most self-evidently
in charge in the great Western democracies, whose adulation of Wilson in
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On Wilson’s views on centralized power, see Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century:
U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 67.
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Europe in the weeks preceding the Conference he interpreted as a plebiscite
on his way of seeing the world. The immediate instrument of the global
sovereign was the Peace Conference itself. It was up to the peacemakers to
create institutions and to make international law that expressed the sovereign
will. Nothing could have posed a more formidable challenge to a state- and
precedent-based notion of international law held by Robert Lansing.
International Law and the Covenant of the League of Nations
Of course, we cannot reduce the Paris Peace Conference to the Versailles
Treaty (which in any event ended the war only with Germany), still less
the Versailles Treaty to the Covenant of the League of Nations with which
it began.58 But it was through the League that the Wilsonian challenge to
international law comes through most clearly. It is also through Lansing’s
criticism of the League and its creation of the mandate system that his
critique of Wilsonianism proved most incisive.
Wilson’s intention to make the League of Nations the centerpiece of a
new world order was well known before the Armistice. He could scarcely
have made the point more plainly than in the “Metropolitan Opera House”
speech of 27 September 1918. “The constitution of the League of Nations,
and the clear definition of its objects,” he proclaimed, “must be a part,
is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself.”59 He
continued that nations could not effectively end the Great War without
fundamentally restructuring the way they conducted their affairs: “It [the
League] is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought.” This rendered moot Lansing’s contention that
the Conference should first write a treaty or treaties ending the war, and
then turn its attention to the design of an international organization.60 It
also virtually guaranteed that Wilson personally would lead the United
States delegation, as the prophet of the new world order would be unlikely
to delegate so important a task.

58) Narrative histories of the peace conference commonly end with the signing of the Versailles Treaty, most recently the well-crafted book by Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919: Six
Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003).
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The Covenant of the League of Nations served as the preamble to all five
treaties produced by the Paris Peace Conference.61 One of the goals stated
in the preamble was “the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments.” But what
status did this goal confer on the League as an organization? To be sure, it
was established by treaty among sovereign states. As such, Francis Anthony
Boyle has concluded, the League as Wilson conceived it fit in with a “modern
legalistic approach to international relations.”62 Likewise, Janis has agreed
that the League constituted the culmination of Wilson’s “all-encompassing
conversion to the promise of international law….”63 But Wilson scholar
Lloyd Ambrosius has disagreed, and has maintained instead: “the League
was not viewed by Wilson primarily as an instrument of international
law. Rather it promised a new morality.”64 I would agree with Ambrosius
that Wilson never intended the League to be, at least at its inception, an
instrument of the day-to-day details of international law. Indeed, Article
14 of the Covenant deferred to a future proposal for the establishment of a
Permanent Court of International Justice.
Nevertheless, if law expresses the will of the sovereign, the League as
designed would indeed make international law in the name of the people
of the world on the very issue that mattered most – war and peace. Moreover, through the mandates system, the League established a structure for
a post-colonial world order that would establish Wilsonian sovereignty as
far across the globe as Western race theory of the day would allow. Lansing
understood as well as Wilson or anyone else that the logic of the Covenant
shifted the locus of sovereignty from the state to “the people,” conceived as
the global community of self-sovereign individuals. In private and eventually in public, he opposed the Covenant accordingly.
By virtue of their moral and material power, the Great Powers would play
the leading role in directing the League of Nations. The new organization
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would comprise a Council and an Assembly, assisted by an administrative
secretariat. The five Great Powers would sit permanently on the Council,
together with four other rotating members, to be selected by the Assembly
(made up of all League members). The writ of both the Council and the
Assembly was described in exactly the same words. Both “may deal at its
meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. [Articles 3 and 4].” But the Council would
remain the senior body. It would advise on the fulfillment of Article 10,
perhaps the most sweeping provisions of the Covenant, which guaranteed
the “territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members
of the League.” The Council would be responsible for managing international
disputes, and for recommending further action if diplomacy and arbitration
should fail (Articles 12–17). It would also make recommendations to protect
collective security arrangements (Article 16–17), according to which an attack on any member of the League would be considered an attack on all.
Despite their central role in the League, the Great Powers were not supposed to make law on war and peace according to the rules of nineteenth
century realism, rather, according to the principles that had brought them
together at the time of the Armistice, now institutionalized by the Covenant.
Their legitimacy as Great Powers had to rest on moral as well as material
grounds, as a beacon and protector to the rest of the world. Their will to
peace would have to exist through the will of the others. Only this collective
intentionality could make workable Article 5, which called for unanimity in
all League decisions, both in the Council and the Assembly. Errant states,
Great Powers or otherwise, would be set to right by appeals to “the people,”
both within that state and beyond it. Wilson plainly showed how he meant
the League to function even before it was established, in what proved his
ill-fated appeal to the Italian people in April 1919 over the fate of Fiume on
the Adriatic Sea.65

65)

Fiume was a ferociously contested example of “self-determination,” over whether the city
would be incorporated into Italy or the new South Slav state. A likely small Italian majority
in the city proper existed alongside a clear South Slav majority in the suburbs. Wilson tried
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own government. See Daniela Rossini, Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy:
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University Press, 2008), Ch. 7, “The Paradox of the Fiume Affair,” 169–192.
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In the long run, the viability of the structures set up by the Covenant
would have to depend the most radical Wilsonian proposition – that all
political collectivities, in particular the Great Powers, considered themselves
accountable to the sovereign people of the world, presumed as one always to
want peace. In this sense, the League would create the reality posited in the
Covenant. The subtle but profound shift in the locus of sovereignty beyond
the Great Power and even beyond the nation-state made the Covenant a
revolutionary document in the history of international relations. The true
world sovereign would henceforth be the final authority in making international law on war and peace.
Thinking about the League in this way makes it possible to reconsider a
standard realist critique of Wilsonianism – its naïve reliance on moral suasion rather than material power. This critique lies at the heart of Ambrosius’s
argument that Wilson never considered the League an instrument of international law. But if the true locus of sovereignty on the most basic matter
of international law is the global community of self-sovereign individuals,
and if each of those individuals is guided by common values, moral suasion
is power of the most efficacious kind. Physical force, should it be required
in some future international conflict, would operate only in the name of
the superior, moral force of the sovereign people of the world.
Conceiving the League as the organizer of global popular sovereignty on
war and peace also makes it possible to make sense of Wilson’s otherwise
bizarre claim during the “League fight” that Article X obligated the United
States morally rather than legally, and did not infringe upon its traditional
freedom in international relations.66 As quintessential global as well as
American citizens, Wilson’s compatriots would see to it that their country
upheld the right in the world. They would do so first by moral force, then
by physical force if necessary, as they had done in joining the Great War
in 1917. To paraphrase the language of Rousseau’s Social Contract, in committing themselves to the world, American citizens and the republic they
ruled would remain as free as before.
There can be little doubt that Wilson saw the League as something
more than the sum of the national sovereignties it comprised. As he put it
in introducing the Covenant to the Plenary Conference on February 14:
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See Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Woodrow Wilson, Alliances, and the League of Nations,”
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The significance of the result, therefore, has that deepest of meanings, the union
of wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot be resisted, and
which I dare say no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist.67

The League was simply the organized expression of that will. As such, it
would continue to create the reality of a global community of self-sovereign
individuals. If liberalism depends on internalized, shared values, it has long
been well disposed toward the external imposition of those values. Jeremy
Bentham, after all, was an intellectual forebear to John Stuart Mill. Although
he never used the Benthamite word, Wilson told the Plenary Conference at
its second meeting on January 25 that he saw the League as the Panopticon
of world peace, “the eye of the nations, to keep watch upon the common
interest – an eye that did not slumber, an eye that was everywhere watchful
and attentive.”68
Through the mandate system, the Covenant also sought to make new
international law by providing for the disposition of the imperial domains
of the defeated Central Powers. The mandate would provide an alternative
to the traditional imperial acquisition, in which the colonial power simply
appropriated the sovereignty of the conquered territory, either through
direct rule or the establishment of a protectorate. Although the concept of
a mandate owed more to General Jan Smuts than to Wilson, it fit well with
the notion of a world of political communities governed by collectivities
of self-sovereign individuals.69 Article 22 of the Covenant spoke of “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves in the strenuous conditions of the
modern world,” whose best interests and prospects constituted “a sacred
trust of civilization.” At least in theory, the sole purpose of the mandate
was to assist such peoples in learning to govern themselves. In other words,
the mandate had a planned obsolescence. “The people” would eventually
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become sovereign across the globe, or at least those people belonging to
races deemed eligible to make covenants.
As I have argued, the Wilsonian imaginary always accommodated difference that produced politically significant hierarchies. Wilson’s own views on
race are well known, notably his comfort with the increasing racial segregation of American society.70 Accordingly, Article 22 posited a hierarchy of
former colonies, based on a given people’s propensity toward evolving into
a proper liberal community – what would become the Class A, B, and C
mandates. “Certain Communities” in the former Ottoman Empire deserved
a kind of provisional recognition as independent states, and required only
“the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until
such time as they are able to stand alone.”71 Other peoples, such as those of
Central Africa, needed more direct rule, in order to guarantee “freedom of
conscience and religion,” in order to suppress the arms, drug, alcohol, and
slave trades, and to prevent the raising of indigenous armies for nefarious
purposes. For still other and less capable peoples, something that looked
very much like outright colonial annexation seemed appropriate. These
peoples and their territories “can best be administered under the laws of
the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards
above mentioned in the name of the indigenous population.”
Yet where, as Lansing would later pointedly ask, did sovereignty actually lay in the mandates? Until the League actually came into existence,
sovereignty in these territories evidently lay with the Great Powers, considering that they had begun to assign mandates and even before they signed
the Versailles Treaty.72 But thereafter, the implied answer seems clear.
Sovereignty would lay with the peoples of the mandated territories, who
would come into their inheritance once they acquired the characteristics
of liberal political adulthood. According to racial beliefs of the day, some
peoples would achieve adulthood swiftly, others at some indefinite point
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in the future, still others perhaps never. Liberalism has always been about
including commensurable individuals deemed eligible for membership in
the political community rather than including absolutely everyone. The
devil has always been in the details.
The League, in short, was supposed to create international law in establishing the foundations of a new order for the colonial world, and ultimately
a post-colonial world. For the moment, it sought to make law only for the
former colonies of the defeated empires. It assuredly did not imagine that
all colonized peoples had been created equal, though it also posited that
inclusion in the global community of self-sovereign citizens did not depend
entirely on white skin. The assumption of self-governance in the mandated
territories had to pose troubling questions about the continued viability of
colonial rule on the part of states that did not happen to be on the losing
side of the Great War. Wilson, himself the political heir of the American
anti-colonial rebels of 1774, clearly saw the Covenant not as the exception
to the rules of the international relations of colonialism, but as the first
statement on those rules by the emerging global sovereign. As he put it to
the Plenary Conference in introducing the Covenant on February 14:
We have had many instances of colonies lifted into the sphere of complete
self-government. This is not the discovery of a principle. It is the universal
application of a principle. It is the agreement of the great nations which have
tried to live by these standards in their separate administrations to unite in
seeing that their common force and their common thought and intelligence
are lent to this great and humane enterprise.73

The philosophical differences between Lansing and Wilson on the role
of international law in the new world order became clear as the Paris Peace
Conference began. Wilson’s previously noted testy remark about not permitting lawyers to draft the peace apparently occurred during a meeting of
the American delegation in which Lansing presented his own ideas about
the League of Nations. At the time of the Peace Conference, Lansing had
developed a view of international law and world order that, in its way,
was as transformative as that of Wilson. But it was based on a positivist,
nineteenth-century understanding of the building of international law.
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Lansing understood very well the revolutionary nature of the challenge
posed by Wilsonianism, and he opposed it on that basis.
In Lansing’s counter-vision to Wilsonianism, the victory of 1918 heralded
a new dawn for international law, in which the world would pick up where
the Hague Conventions of 1907 left off. Lansing’s proposals for a League of
Nations envisaged its primary function as juridical. A proper League would
solve the great matters of war and peace through arbitration. As early as
17 December 1918, nearly a month before the Conference began, Lansing
recounted a meeting with fellow American delegation member and Wilson
confidante Edward House:
I urged him [House] in the course of our conversation ‘to persuade the President to make the nucleus of his proposed League of Nations as an international
court pointing out that it was the simplest and best way of organizing the
world for peace, and that, if in addition the general principles of international
law were codified and the right of inquiry confided to the court, everything
practical would have been done to prevent wars in the future.’74

In more involved proposals written up on December 21, Lansing proposed
that the International Council of the League (that is, the plenary) elect a
5-member Supervisory Committee, each member of which would serve a
2-year term.75 The Supervisory Committee remained clearly the servant of
the plenary Council, and not the executive body enforcing world peace as
imagined in Wilson’s proposal. The Council, and not the Committee, would
call an international conference to revise the Hague Conventions of 1907.76
The main duty of the Supervisory Committee would involve supervising
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Lansing, Peace Negotiations, 73. Lansing quoted here from one of his self-generated
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the arbitration of international disputes through a separately established
Arbitral Tribunal. As he sought to rewrite Wilson’s Covenant, Lansing held
to the view that the supreme penalty for a nation for violating international
law should be banishment from the community of nations rather than the
threat of physical force.77
In his critique of Wilsonianism, Lansing’s abiding fixation revolved
around preserving the nation-state as the locus of sovereignty, even – perhaps especially – if doing so meant circumscribing the capabilities of the
Great Powers. As his disconnect with Wilson became more serious, Lansing
became increasingly concerned with the doctrine of the equality of nations.
While, as I have indicated, this doctrine had not been a matter of great
concern in his previous writings on sovereignty and international law. But
it was quite consistent with nineteenth century notions, in Kennedy’s words
with specific reference to Lansing, of there being “but one sovereignty, an
absolute discretion with a monopoly of force.”78 This sovereignty could
not be compromised in a given territory. International law that endeavored
to reach beyond the sovereign state – as in the case of the League toward
a sovereign liberal individual – could be neither legitimate nor effective.
On 5 September 1919, Lansing addressed the American Bar Association
on legal questions pertaining to the Peace Conference. He distinguished
between judicial and diplomatic ways to resolve international disputes. Diplomacy was about politics, working out agreements among nations more
often than not unequal in power. By definition, the judicial pertained to
law, which could resolve disputes only among equals:
… the two modes of settlement differ in that a judicial settlement rests upon
the precept that all nations, whether great or small, are equal, but in the sphere
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See Lansing, Peace Negotiations, 37–38. On the general nature of this view among American specialists, see Hepp, “James Brown Scott.” Lansing appeared to have changed his views
since 1909, when he wrote: “The aroused conscience of civilized states and the constantly
increasing force of moral obligation can never form substitutes for an executive and the
physical might upon which its authority rests.” Review of William I. Hull, The Two Hague
Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law, AJIL 3 (1909): 261–62.
78)

Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century,” 407. Kennedy refers to
Lansing, “Notes on Sovereignty in a State.”

Smith / Journal of the History of International Law 13 (2011) 179–208

203

of diplomacy the inequality of nations is not only recognized but unquestionably influences the adjustment of international differences.79

Lansing remained untroubled by the fact that the treaties establishing institutions of international law such as courts of arbitration were determined
through diplomacy, and that as a result states could hardly be considered
equal in the formation of international law. As S.W. Armstrong put it, legal
equality did not imply political equality, in a liberal international order any
more than in a liberal democracy.80 States of varying capacities in material
power would come together to agree on the principles of international law,
and would thereby commit themselves to living according to its precepts.
But in binding all states equally, international law affirmed the state as object
of the law, and hence as the locus of sovereignty. No state could have its
internal sovereignty compromised in the realm of the judicial.81
As Lansing wrote to himself in a memo of 22 November, “the legal
principle [of the equality of nations], whatever its basis in fact, must be
preserved, otherwise force rather than law, the power to act rather than the
right to act, becomes the fundamental principle of organization….”82 For
Lansing, the linchpin of Wilson’s Covenant was the “positive guarantee”
of Article 10, which obligated all members of the League to preserve each
others’ independence and territorial integrity. Enforcement would occur
on the advice of the League Council.83 To Lansing, as to opponents of the
League in the Senate, Article 10 committed the United States to potential
foreign wars whatever its national will in the matter.84 He also believed
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that the Covenant as written also made the League ipso facto an oligarchy
of Great Powers, as only they would have the physical force at hand to
guarantee peace. The permanent majority the Great Powers would enjoy on
the Council would simply institutionalize oligarchy as the agent structuring
the international system.85
Of course, as Wilson had conceived the League, states (Great Powers or
others) would no longer act as self-interested entities in a zero-sum game
of global power. Rather, they would operate according to a globally applicable system of ethics, under the panoptical gaze of the League. If they
failed to do so, popular opinion would be mobilized against them, in the
territories under their own direct sovereignty and across the globe. If the
League actually functioned as Wilson intended, the resort to physical force
would seldom be necessary, if ever. But every nation’s sovereignty would be
under perpetual inspection by the League, as the instrument of the global
community of citizens on which its legitimacy rested. This was precisely
what Lansing had come to fear. He could scarcely have been surprised that
Wilson did not grant Lansing’s conception of a League serious consideration
within the American delegation, let alone by the Conference as a whole.
As I have noted, sovereignty in mandated territories would clearly lay
with “the people” once they became independent, a notion with which it
is hard to imagine that Lansing would have disagreed. But where would
sovereignty lay in the interim? The claim in Article 22 of the Covenant
that “the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust
of civilization” did not clarify the situation. Nor did the claim that tutelage
of these peoples would take place “on behalf of the League.” In a memo to
himself dated 2 February 1919, Lansing raised some pointed questions about
the Mandates System that highlight the problematic character not just of
the mandates, but of the League itself under international law.86
The appointment of a mandatory to exercise sovereign rights over a territory
is to create an agent for the real sovereign. But who is the real sovereign?

territorial integrity of other members.
85) See particularly Lansing, Peace Negotiations, Ch. 6, “The President’s Plan and the Cecil
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Is the League of Nations the sovereign, or is it a common agent of the League,
to whom is confided solely the duty of naming the mandatory and issuing
the mandate?
… Does the League possess the attributes of an independent state so that it
can function as an owner of territory? If so, what is it? A world state?

The language of Article 22 seemed to suggest that mandatory power was
tutelary and administrative, and existed at the discretion of the League. But
then, as Lansing noted, to whom would the mandatory powers answer? If
they answered to the League, we would have to infer that the League was at
least the provisional possessor of sovereignty in the mandates. If the League
could possess sovereignty, even provisionally, it had an important attribute
of a world state – something even its most avid proponents seldom dared
say in so many words. If the mandatory powers were not accountable to the
League, it is difficult to see how mandates differed from nineteenth-century
style colonies and protectorates. Lansing, in fact, much preferred a clear
transfer of sovereignty in the former German and Ottoman domains to the
mandatory/colonial powers. Clearly, the Wilsonian vision had something
else in mind, with profound implications for the articulation of sovereignty
in the world order.87
Conclusions
In two instances of what today we might call “acting out,” Woodrow Wilson
and Robert Lansing stated with exceptional candor the issues at stake in their
competing visions of international law and world order. On 9 May 1919,
Wilson made some remarks after a private dinner hosted by Sir Thomas
Barclay, a renowned barrister and vice-president of the International Law
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Quincy Wright concluded by 1923 that “it is not certain that complete sovereignty rests
anywhere” in the mandate system. He concluded somewhat weakly: “there will be a close
approach to the truth in ascribing sovereignty of the mandated territories to the mandatory
acting with the consent of the Council of the League.” See “Sovereignty in the Mandates,”
AJIL 17 (1923): 694, 698. Such a description gives mandates a character not that distinct
from colonies and protectorates. It would also seem to imply that the consent of the Council
could become pro forma. After all, the Council included the three most important mandatory
powers (Britain, France, and Japan) as permanent members.
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Association. Wilson left little doubt that his reservations about lawyers went
well beyond his personal frustrations with Robert Lansing:
International law has perhaps been a little too much thought out in the closet.
International law has – may I say it without offense? – been handled too exclusively by lawyers. Lawyers like definite lines. They like systematic arrangements.
They are uneasy if they depart from what was done yesterday. They dread
experiments. They like charted seas, and if they have no chart, hardly venture
to undertake the voyage. Now we must venture upon uncharted seas to some
extent in the future. In the new League of Nations, we are starting out upon
uncharted seas, and therefore, we must have, I will not say the audacity, but
the steadiness of purpose which is necessary in such novel circumstances.88

Not content with insulting the profession of his audience, he went on to
insult them as members of their social class. He continued that he considered it a great privilege at the Peace Conference to have been able to engage
in “thinking for mankind, human thinking, thinking that is shot through
with sympathy, thinking that is made up of comprehension for the needs
of mankind.” In doing so, he confessed, “I must say that I do not always
think of well-dressed persons.” Of course, only persons so attired would
have been present at the dinner.
In the reprinted edition of these remarks, the always-sympathetic editors of the Papers of Woodrow Wilson attribute his rhetorical biting of the
hand that literally had fed him to the accumulated stress of the Paris Peace
Conference and to his deteriorating health. They suggest that in momentary
disorientation, he fell back on well-worn talking points from his political
campaigns. But I doubt Wilson said much to his hosts that he did not
mean. “International law” as underpinned by nineteenth-century positivism had become part of the problem of unrestricted national sovereignty.
“Mankind,” as he construed it in terms of race and gender as well as class,
had to be recognized as the true world sovereign. That sovereign, Wilson
believed, intended to lay down new international law on war and peace. As
spokesman for the global community, Wilson had help construct an institution that would make law on mankind’s most vital concern. International
lawyers, and international law as it had developed by 1919, could henceforth
88)

“After-Dinner Remarks,” typed manuscript, Woodrow Wilson papers, Library of Congress, reprinted in PWW, vol. 58: 598–600.
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become part of the solution or remain part of the problem. Yet Wilson’s
outburst also highlights Kennedy’s call to recognize what twentieth-century
internationalist approaches to international law owed to its forebears. Wilsonianism, after all, had made the enlightened Great Powers the instrument
of the world sovereign. And how could a Great Power be anything but the
full expression of state sovereignty?
Masked in damnation through faint praise of the Versailles Treaty,
Lansing’s speech before the American Bar Association in September 1919
contained a withering denunciation of Wilsonianism clear to anyone who
understood Lansing’s views on what had happened in Paris. Certainly, the
speech was a surprising commentary from the sitting secretary of state,
the second highest-ranking member of the Wilson administration. On
September 5, the day of Lansing’s speech, Wilson was on the second day
of his Western speaking tour, fighting for American participation in the
League without reservations that would have severely weakened it.89 Lansing’s thinly veiled comparison of the ideas of his president with Bolshevism
suggested he understood the revolutionary potential of Wilsoniansim very
well indeed. He argued that the late war had given rise to something he
called “the communistic doctrine Mundanism.”
This pseudo-Internationalism seeks to make classes or in some cases individuals
the units of world organization rather than nations. It is the enemy of Nationalism which is the basis of world order as we know it. It is a real, though not
always an open, enemy of national independence and of national sovereignty.90

Lansing argued that the millenarian aspirations of the Great War had given
rise to two alternatives to the nation-state as the locus of sovereignty, the
individual and the social class. Dislocating the state would have dire consequences across the globe. Though he did not explain just how, locating
sovereignty at the level of the individual would shortly give way to locating
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Although Lansing could not have known it when he made the speech, Wilson would
be fighting for his life just over a month later following a series of strokes. However, he was
aware of Wilson’s condition by the time the speech was published in the AJIL in October
1919. And he certainly understood how gravely Wilson had been stricken by the time he
published his far more personal attacks in The Peace Negotiations (1921).

90)

Lansing, “Some Legal Questions of the Peace Conference,” 632. Emphasis added. All
citations from this speech appear on this page.
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it at the level of class. “We cannot ignore,” he continued, “the dangerous
possibility that moderate forms [of Mundanism] may under certain influences develop into extreme [forms] and threaten our political institutions.”
There seems little doubt that he meant Wilsonianism as one such “moderate” form. The nation, in short, had to be the guardian of order through
sovereignty and the law, both internally and in the world system. Only full
state sovereignty could save the world from Bolshevism. By September 1919,
Lansing had also come to conflate “nation” and “state” in ways he had been
careful to avoid in his prewar writings.
In his way, Lansing also illustrated the complex ties between pre-GreatWar and post-Great-War paradigms of international law. Indeed, one could
even interpret the rise of Wilsonianism in terms outlined in Lansing’s 1906
essay “Notes on World Sovereignty.” At the very least, Lansing’s earlier
writings show the eagerness of a nineteenth-century positivist to engage
change in the international order at the dawn of the new century. If one
follows Lansing’s prewar argument into the postwar, the world sovereign had
showed itself in the outcome of the Great War and the summoning of “the
world” to the Paris Peace Conference, both to end that war and to create
a new international system. That sovereign, one could argue, subsequently
sought to make new international law on the most basic matters of war and
peace through the League of Nations. I have argued that this, at any rate,
was how Wilson saw it.
Lansing himself, however, seemed to recoil from the implications of his
prewar speculations, to warn of what he saw as a dangerous new system.
He sought refuge in the nation, and counseled ominously in his September
5 speech:
We ought to realize that the world cannot be organized on both Mundanism
and Nationalism. The political cleavage must be between nations or between
classes. We must choose between these two conceptions of world order.
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